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Editorial
TALES OF MULTIPLE DECOLONISATIONS
Prabhakar Singh
Guest Editor
Professor, BML Munjal University School of Law, Gurugram, India;
DAAD Professor, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany
prabhakarsingh.adv@gmail.com

I. INTRODUCTION
The Indonesian Journal of International Law (IJIL) is pleased to host the
first of its two issues on the Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL). We are editing this TWAIL issue, incidentally, in the backdrop
of the novelist Amitav Ghosh’s The Nutmeg’s Curse that plants nutmeg, a
product exclusive to the Banda islands in Indonesia, at the core of the Dutch
colonization of Indonesia and the contemporary climate crisis affecting
islands.1 TWAIL is an epistemological journey that developing country
scholars have been charting since decolonization.2 Indonesia had played a key
role in re-thinking decolonization. As one of the world’s chief archipelagic
states instrumental in establishing an “archipelagic consciousness” at the 3rd
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference between 1971-82, Indonesia has
made significant contributions to international law.3 This is natural since the
Indonesian territory comprises of about 17500 islands.
Indian R.P. Anand and Egyptian-origin Georges Abi-Saab are two
important names that readily come to our mind when considering the role
of the newly decolonized states in international law.4 At the same time, the
A. Ghosh, The Nutmeg’s Curse: Parables for a Planet in Crisis (Penguin, 2021).
B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto," International
Community Law Review 8 (2006), 3–27.
3
For the UNCLOS, ‘(a) “archipelagic State” means a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands; (b) “archipelago” means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.’ 3rd United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 397 (1982), Art. 46.
4
R. P. Anand, "Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries in the Present International Legal
Order," American Journal of International Law 56 (1962), 383–406. Georges Abi-Saab, "The
newly independent states and the rules of international law: an outline," Howard Law Journal
1

2

iii

Indonesian scholar JJG Syatauw debated if calling the decolonized states
“new” prevented such states from contributing to international law.5 The RP
Anand-led New Delhi seminar in November 1967 centered on these tensions
apparent in the universalization of international law after decolonization. The
conference proceedings were published in an edited volume. Upendra Baxi
opened the anthology by defining eurocentrism in the following words
"Eurocentrism, a term susceptible to pejorative use, refers to settled
habits or thoughts which have led to the mostly uncritical acceptance of
European and Western intellectual and socio-cultural traditions as the
invariable. In its most acute form, it has led to the unnecessary denigration of Indigenous traditions of the colonized nations. However, it had
led to a continuing indiffe ence to these traditions even in the scholarly
discourses, in its milder and pervasive form. This has been particularly
unfortunate because, publicists are “functional equivalents” of municipal
constitutive structures in international law."6
R.P. Anand’s anthology facilitated a robust conversation between Percy
Corbett, Richard Falk, Leo Gross, J.J.G. Syatauw, Quincy Wright and Indian
scholars on international law’s universalization. They were the leading
international lawyers of that generation and many sat on the American Journal
of International Law’s editorial board. Quincy Wright, Anand’s mentor,
did not live to see the publishing of this important anthology.7 Wright was
instrumental in the publication of Anand’s paper titled “Role of the “New”
Asian-African Countries” which became a template for other developing
country scholars.8
Within a decade and a half of Anand’s anthology, in 1984-85, foreign
graduate students at Harvard Law School organised the first seminar on the
Third World attitudes to international law. The result was a collection edited
by Thai scholar Surakiart Sathirathai titled Third World Attitudes Toward
International Law: An Introduction. 9
At this point, Anand’s focus had turned to the United Nations Convention
8 (1962), 97-121.
5
J.J.G. Syatauw, Some Newly Established Asian States and the Development of International
Law (M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960).
6
U. Baxi, "Some Remarks on Eurocentrism and the Law of Nations," in, RP Anand, ed. Asian
states and Development of Universal International Law (Vikas Publications, 1972) 3.
7
"Dr. Quincy Wright, 79, Is Dead; Authority on International Law; Proponent of Understanding" New York Times. (October 18, 1970).
8
Anand, "Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries," 383 – 406.
9
F. Snyder and S. Sathirathai, Third World Attitudes Toward International Law: An Introduction (M. Nijhoff, 1987) xii
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on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 The UNCLOS had recognized the
“archipelagic principle,” if you will, as an antidote to the territorial nationalism
of large states. Indonesia and the Philippines were the primary Asian states
to have benefited from this development. Anand’s tradition shone through in
Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja’s 1992 study on “the contribution of New States”
and the UNCLOS. A scholar and former foreign minister of Indonesia,
Kusuma-Atmadja highlighted that Indonesia’s was the world’s “first national
application by the law of the principle of straight baselines, recognized in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.”11 Thus, Indonesia has been a keen student
of the post-postcolonial international law, the UNCLOS being its robust
example.
After Sathirthai and Snyder, another group of graduate students and
visitors at the Harvard Law School organized a conference in the Spring of
1997. The group comprising Celestine Nyamu, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Hani
Sayed, Vasuki Nesiah, Elchi Nowrojee, BS Chimni, and James Gathii, coined
the term TWAIL.12 They received the mentorship of Antony Anghie and
Makau Wa Mutuwa.13 TWAIL conferences have since been held in Oregon,
Cairo, and Singapore.

II. TWAIL AND ITS DISCONTENTS
The decolonization of Africa and Asia doubtless marked a new beginning
of history.14 Asia decolonized nearly a decade before Africa, whereas, by
1960s, most of the Latin American states had been independent for a century.
This prompts crucial questions: “What did Latin America make of this headstart?” and “What did it offer to the countries that were in the process of
getting independence?”. Many Latin American states are white settler-states
built on indigenous pasts. In South Asia, contrarily, caste-based discrimination
10
R.P. Anand, ed. International Law: Law of the Sea and Beyond (Radiant Publishers, New
Delhi, 1978).
11
M. Kusuma-Atmadja, "The Contribution of New States to the Development of International
Law" Santa Clara Law Review 32 (1992), 889, 903.
12
J.T. Gathii, "TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography" Trade Law & Development 3 (2011), 26, 28; Antony Anghie, "TWAIL:
Past and Future," International Community Law Review 10 (2008), 479; J.T. Gathii, "Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on Developing Countries to
International Legal Theory, Symposium Issue Foreword" Harvard International Law Journal
41 (2000), 263.
13
A. Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
International Law," Harvard International Law Journal 40 (1990), 1-80.
14
M. N. Shaw, "The international status of national liberation movements," Liverpool Law
Review 5 (1983), 19–34.

v

continues even as religious minorities have been at the receiving ends of
rising majoritarianism.15 Nevertheless, the developing country status of Latin
American states save them from a settler-state critique. Most recently, Chile’s
rejection of a new “plurinational constitution” in September 2022, for many,
indicates the continuing legacy of “settler colonialism” in Latin America.16
Moving away from state-centrism, a central TWAIL tenet, necessitates that
developing and developed settler-states be equally critiqued from the sociology
of law lens.17 And, TWAIL, of all movements, must stand at this forefront.
On closer scrutiny under the sociology of law lens, the “semi-peripheral
consciousness”18 referred to by Becker Lorca seems to partially stem from
Latin American settler-colonialism.19 It then also becomes obvious why
for some scholars, while their narrative gets oxygen from their developing
country passports, their jobs come from the European ones. Too, much of the
Latin doctrines in international law, Calvo clause for example, can then be
seen as a product of the white-settlers resistance in Latin America to European
colonialism. And yet, about 20 years of TWAIL-ing has passed without a
direct and critical examination of the question of race and law in South-South
relations.20
We need to recall that it was in Latin America, in Montevideo, that an
international convention to settle the definition of the modern 20th century
state was convened.21 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, United States of America, and Venezuela participated in
15
Srinivas Burra, "TWAIL’s Others: A Caste Critique of TWAILers and Their Field of Analysis," Windsor YB Access Justice 33 (2016), 111.
16
New Amauta (@AmautaNew), ‘Chile has just rejected its new plurinational constitution,’
Twitter, https://twitter.com/AmautaNew/status/1566640585808588800.
17
Besides the indigenous population, the racism against Afro-descendants is another issue
in Latin America. See, Judith Morrison, "Race and Poverty in Latin America: Addressing the
Development Needs of African Descendants," The UN Chronicle, https://www.un.org/en/
chronicle/article/race-and-poverty-latin-america-addressing-development-needs-african-descendants.
18
A. Becker-Lorca, "Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of Imposition
and Appropriation," Harvard International Law Journal 51 (2010), 475, 502.
19
R. Merino, "Reimagining the Nation-State: Indigenous Peoples and the Making of Plurinationalism in Latin America," Leiden Journal of International Law 31 (2018), 773–92.
20
Four Indian-American women on August 26 were racially abused by a Mexican-American
woman in Texas who hurled abusive racial comments at them. The Texas woman said that they
are “ruining America” and should “go back to India”. See, "Four Indian-American women
racially abused, assaulted in Texas," The Hindu (26 August 2022). Likewise, Hindu Indian
American was abused by a Sikh Indian American. See, ‘Indian-American racially abused in
California,’ The Indian Express (1 September 2022).
21
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS (1933) 19, Art. 1.
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this 1933 Convention. Latin America and the Caribbean thus, both, supply the
modern definition of state as well as send to us the first glimpse of the idea
that nationalism is a European export routed through the Americas to Asia and
Africa.
It is, therefore, significant that the critique of TWAIL has come from
Latin American scholars for TWAIL’s setting too much in store by the
decolonization of 1960s. For example, Becker Lorca argues that ‘resistance
is not the exclusive patrimony of third-world international lawyers who
were active during the 1960s decolonization [and] [d]efying the Eurocentric
assumptions of international legal scholarship is not an exclusivity of
contemporary international lawyers acquainted with postcolonial studies.’22
However, far from claiming any exclusivity on “resistance,” Anand had often
noted that the “western” lawyers were the first to advocate for resistance since
most new states accepted international law’s tutelage.23 After all, KusumaAtmadja’s claim was that Indonesia was the first to accept, not reject, the
International Court of Justice (the ICJ) ruling. Becker Lorca’s narrative of a
semi-peripheral consciousness essentially attempts to set the effective date of
the developing country resistance to international law to the 19th century and
not the middle of the 20th, the time of decolonization. Such an effort coming
from the reading of the Japanese, Thai, Ethiopian, Ottoman and Argentine
practices, the participants of the Hague Peace Conference 1907, tells a story
that is different from the decolonisation that happened in the 1950s.
Similarly, the Brazilian lawyer George Galindo finds TWAIL classification
into two phases problematic due to an alleged “difficul self-identification of
past third world legal scholars”.24 Galindo supports “the inner coherence”
of the TWAIL movement. The perceived disparity between Latin American
and Asian states, arguably, stems from a century-long gap in their respective
decolonization(s). Not all Latin American states might even want to call their
independence from Spain and Portugal decolonization like the Asians. After
all “semi-periphery” and “periphery” must produce, not just temporally but
also normatively, different decolonisation(s).
Becker-Lorca, "Universal International Law" 502.
P. Singh, "Reading R P Anand in the Post-Colony," in, Jochen von Bernstorff and Philipp
Dann (eds) The Battle for International Law: South-North Perspectives on the Decolonization
Era (OUP, 2019) 297.
24
G. Galindo, "Splitting TWAIL?" Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 33 (2016), 37; See,
J. D. Haskell, "TRAIL-Ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches
to International Law," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 27 (2014), 383–414. S. G.
Sreejith, "An auto-critique of TWAIL’s historical fallacy: sketching an alternative manifesto,"
Third World Quarterly 38 (2017), 1511-1530.
22

23
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It is then apparent that the post-coloniality of international law needs
unpacking from not just colonial lens, but also from semi-colonial one. In that
case, we might want to consider at least three continuing decolonisations; the
semi-peripheral (Montevideo Convention, 1933), the peripheral (after the UN
Charter, 1945), and the archipelagic (the UNCLOS, 1982) to fully account for
the wholesale developing country experiences.

III. THE UNCLOS AND TWAIL: DRAWING LINES ON WATER
Politics is boiling Asians seas today. Therefore, readers have to look no
further than land and sea disputes in Asia to evaluate the fruitful impact, if any,
of TWAIL on people’s lives. Most Asian states, except China, have accepted
third-party territorial dispute settlement. Cambodia,25 Thailand, India,26
Pakistan,27 Indonesia,28 Malaysia, and Singapore29 have all gone to the ICJ. The
Philippines has used the provisions of the UNCLOS to trigger a Permanent
Court of Arbitration case against China’s imposition of a nine-dash line on
the South China Sea.30 Moreover, Asian judges have immensely contributed
to the development of international law. Judge Nagendra Singh was the ICJ’s
President when the Court delivered its landmark ruling in the Nicaragua
case on “non-intervention” as a settled customary international law.31 Judge
Weeramantry’s much celebrated dissent in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion presented South Asian epics as mirroring nuclear catastrophe.32
How about the islands, Asian states, and international law? Speaking for
Indonesia, the issues of islands in Asia was once dismissed by Judge ad hoc
Thomas Franck as “the fate of history in obscure places”. For Judge Franck,
the two disputed Islands between Indonesia and Malaysia, namely Ligitan and
Sipadan, were “not the stuff of which history is made, at least until recently.”33
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) Merits, Judgment [1962] ICJ Rep 6.
Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits) [1960] ICJ Rep 6.
27
Arial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India) Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment
[2000] ICJ Rep 12.
28
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia) [2002] ICJ Rep
625.
29
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment, [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 39.
30
The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China), Award of
12 July 2016, https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2086.
31
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), merits, [1986] ICJ Rep 12, para 246.
32
Dissenting Opinion of Judge C.G. Weeramantry, in, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 429, 257.
33
Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Franck, in, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau
25
26

viii

Editorial Note: Tales of Multiple Decolonisations

While judge Franck gave the two islands to Indonesia, the ICJ awarded it to
Malaysia based on proof of effective occupation and control using colonial
stationery.
In the case between Malaysia and Singapore, the ICJ found that ‘the nature
and degree of the Johor’s Sultan authority exercised over the Orang Laut,’ “the
people of the sea,” inhabiting the islands in the Straits of Singapore ‘confirms
the ancient original title of the Sultanate of Johor to those islands, including
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh.’34 In those words, the ICJ sanctified the
histories of the people presented before it by states so long as it is supported,
like in the Malaysia/Singapore case, by colonial stationery. Malaysia’s claim
was supported by ‘a letter from J.T. Thomson, the Government Surveyor of
Singapore, reporting in November 1850’.35 The South China Sea islands, even
rocks, are hardly obscure and in fact stand at the center of Asian peace. At
the core of Asian peace are significant historical, literary, and methodological
issues in international legal scholarship.
International law, as the ICJ disputes have shown, only accepts colonial
histories. A non-participating semi-peripheral China provides its alternative
to history through “literary works” as evidenced by the arguments in the
South China Sea dispute. Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, for instance,
argue for “literary works” from “time immemorial” for the pre-1935
account of the historical evolution of the nine-dash line in Chinese
practices.36 Zhiguo Gao is a judge of the Law of the Sea Tribunal at Hamburg
and Bing Bing Jia is a professor of international law. The Natuna fishing
grounds within Indonesia’s 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone under
the UNCLOS also overlap the nine-dash line. China defends this nine-dash
line using literary works from “two millennia” ago. Chinese foreign
ministry’s Position Paper, for example, on the South China Sea dispute
asserts: ‘China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Island.
Chinese activities in the South Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago’.37 The
Chinese state as well as Chinese publicists speak in common voice.
Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia) [2002] ICJ Rep 625, 692.
34
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), Judgment [2008] ICJ Rep 12, 39.
35
Ibid. 37.
36
Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia, "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status,
and Implications," American Journal of International Law 107 (2013), 98, 100.
37
‘China was the first country to discover, name, explore and exploit the resources of the
South China Sea Islands and the first to continuously exercise sovereign powers over them’.
Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (7 December 2013), para. 4, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201412/
t20141207_679387.html. Cf. Andy Hanlun Li, "From alien land to inalienable parts of China:
how Qing imperial possessions became the Chinese Frontiers," European Journal of Interna-
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Ex-colonial Asian states, however, don’t always align with its scholars.
In 1962, India’s legal advisor Krishna Rao, too, argued from the “ancient
Hindu literature” about Indian positions on the Himalayas in his scholarly
writings.38 Contrarily, India’s foreign ministry based its argument on mostly
boundary treaties drawn up by the British, the so-called unequal treaties.39
Most recently, Chinese scholar Jiangfeng Li argues that we ought to “avoid
frivolous challenges” to the validity of treaties using the doctrine of unequal
treaties.40 Nevertheless, Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia’s rhetoric of 2000
years in the South China Sea appears to mimic Krishna Rao’s “over 3,000
years” on the Himalayas, two territories in international law governed by two
regimes, namely treaties and the UNCLOS.
Very importantly, then, a closer reading of the Chinese history of
“imaginary” lines is revealing. It has not been stressed enough that from
the year China claims to have a 9-dash line in the Sea, another line, the
Hu Huanyong Line, an “imaginary line drawn by Chinese geographer Hu
Huanyong in 1935” divided China’s territory diagonally from south to north.41
Needless to say, while the drawing of lines on domestic maps is a sovereign
prerogative, unilateral drawing of lines on international maps by states is a
violation of international law.
The race for the “ancient” in large states has, intriguingly, spurred a similar
trend in smaller states claiming to be the origin of Asian epics. In July 2020,
the Nepalese Prime Minister said: ‘India had claimed the Indian site as the
birthplace of Lord Ram, even though the real Ayodhya lies at Thori in the west
of Birgunj.’42 This situation prompts a crucial question: “Why should Thailand
and Myanmar, both states having cities named Ayodhya and Indonesia famous
for its Ramayana rendition in Prambanan, avoid making such arguments as
tional Relations 28 (2022), 237–262.
38
K. Krishna Rao, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law," International
& Comparative Law Quarterly 11 (1962), 375, 379.
39
K. Krishna Rao died aged 48 while serving as legal adviser in the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs. His obituary noted him “as an expert also in drafting the new regulations to cover man’s
activities in outer space.” ‘Dr. K. Krishna Rao of India, International Law Expert,’ The New
York Times (29 November 1970).
40
Jiangfeng Li, "Equal Or Unequal: Seeking A New Paradigm For The Misused Theory Of
“Unequal Treaties” in Contemporary International Law," Houston Journal of International Law
38 (2016), 465, 498.
41
See, Premier Promotes Urbanization (28 November 2014), http://english.www.gov.cn/premier/news/2014/11/28/content_281475016489266.htm.
42
PM Oli says “real” Ayodhya is in Nepal and Lord Ram is Nepali; BJP rejects claim, The
Hindu (14 July 2020).
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“historical”? This is unlikely, however, since these countries have all been
party to disputes before the ICJ which ensures that only those main sources
of law that are enumerated in the ICJ Statute – treaty, customs, and general
principles – are applicable. Yet Nepal’s political claim for finding real Ayodhya
in Nepal is an iteration of China’s invocation of “literary classics” from two
millennia ago to claim Chinese possessions.43 And both China and Nepal, as
uncolonized polities, inherit a semi-peripheral consciousness of international
law although divided by relative political, economic, and military power.
Needless to say, myths have while united people in Asia, it has brought states
to war when assumed as history.
Does TWAIL view these “literary” alternatives as good histories to replace
“colonial history”? Is that how epistemological decolonization works? TWAIL
should not only speak but supply the contents of the proposed alternatives and
associated problems. Far more important than TWAIL’s coherency is the need
to talk freely about inter-state Asian disputes to ensure TWAIL’s contribution
to dispute resolution. TWAIL must hold and facilitate uncomfortable
conversations in Asia. For example, it is necessary to determine whether
Asian states are extending their territorial nationalism into choppy sea waters
to defeat much-fought decolonization. Should we not see the UNCLOS, 1982,
as third decolonisation after 1933 and 1950-60s? To that end, TWAIL should
investigate the doctrines of international law that larger Asian states use as fig
leaves for their territorial aggrandizement. Beyond plural narratives, TWAIL
must now be a tool for the deconstruction of politics passing off as law and
epistemology.

IV. CONCLUSION
Developing countries are a large group of states with varied histories,
colonialities, and post-colonialities. Only by putting people at the center of
the discourse would displace state-centrism. The loot and subversion of Asia
by British and Dutch East India companies put capitalism at the centre of
colonialism. While establishing a monopoly over distributing the ticket to
civilization, international law ensured that only a few non-western states had
partial recognition; the so called semi-civilized or semi-peripheral states.
The UNCLOS also created right for landlocked states such as Nepal. The UNCLOS Article
125 reads: ‘Land-locked States shall have the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose
of exercising the rights provided for in this Convention including those relating to the freedom
of the high seas and the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked States shall
enjoy freedom of transit through the territory of transit States by all means of transport.’ The
UNCLOS, supra note 3, Art. 125. See, S. Subedi, "Economic Diplomacy for Nepal," The Kathmandu Post (29 November 2020).
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This fabricated lack of civilization furnished logic for intervention which, in
due course, paved the way for investment and laws for its protection. First
projecting investment law as the human rights of multilateral corporations,
uncritical scholarship now borrows from human rights to argue for the
protection of foreign investment.
Various disciplines have tried to capture the truth of colonialism and
globalization in their respective registers. International law has lagged in this
regard since, as a textbook subject, critical insights require lived experiences
and platforms.44 Racism, capitalism, and other structural injustices
continuously de-platform non-western voices nevertheless. At the same time,
lives in the geographical south are mined by global north even though lived
experience cannot be exported nor borrowed for processing. This mining
of the lives of the geographical south must contribute beyond the rituals of
armchair productions.
The novelist Amitav Ghosh exposes a circle of misfortune that loops
Indonesian islands and their people at the receiving ends of colonization
three centuries ago and the climate crisis in the 21st century. The territorial
aggrandizement of the landed Asian nations against archipelagic
consciousness, while placing Amitav Ghosh in international law’s
bibliography, is also the crystal ball for the continuing misfortune at the
Asian seas.
We present to our readers the IJIL’s first TWAIL issue with such sentiments.
We know that readers complete authors. Therefore, we leave it to our readers
to determine whether this TWAIL issue just describes problems or advances
solutions. Indeed, the dialectics between descriptions and solutions must
continue to animate TWAIL scholarship.
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Antony Anghie, "Welcoming the TWAIL Review," TWAIL Review 1 (2020), 1-6.
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